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REACHING SHARES OF STOCK
JOHN E. F. WOOD*
For want of a definition, a share of corporate stock has some-
times been described as being "in the nature of a chose in action";'
but it is recognized to have a complexity peculiar to itself. The
Commissioners on Uniform Laws have recently given us this pro-
posed statutory definition: "Shares are the units into which the
shareholder's rights to participate in the control of the corporation,
in its surplus or profits, or in the distribution of corporate assets,
are divided."'  It is, of course, clear that the shareholder owns
no part of the corporate assets, and his rights are purely in per-
sonam, but his right to be a shareholder and to stand in that per-
sonal relation to the corporation is a right in which he desires
protection as against the world, and is accordingly a right in rem,
subject, like other property rights, to the demands of creditors and
adverse claimants and to the exactions of the tax gatherer.
In declaring what courts and what legislatures have the power
to put their hands upon shares of stock, considered as property
apart from the owner, courts have made use of the concept of situs.
Now the word "situs" means something when applied to an acre
of land or a horse or any other thing which occupies a position
in space; to a lawyer it must mean something when applied by the
courts to shares of stock.
Jurisdiction in Rem'
The assignment of jurisdiction as among various possible
courts is essentially a practical problem: What court can most
effectively and fairly deal with the subject matter? After that
question is answered the law can be rationalized accordingly, and
the theory made to fit the facts. An action in personam ought
generally to be brought in a court which can seize the obligor
because that court alone can guarantee to him a hearing and can
*Member of the Bar, Huntington, West Virginia.
'13 BouviER, LAW DICTIoNARY (3d Rawles, 1914) 3139.
2 UiFORM BusiNEss CoRPoRATioN ACT, § 1.
"Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 46 S. Ct. 256
(1926).
'The phrase "jurisdiction in rem" is here used rather loosely to describe
not only power to make adjudications which will bind all persons indifferently
(Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812 (1900), but also
power to render judgment with respect to rights in or claims upon property
as against particular absent defendants (Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 10
S. Ct, 556 (1890); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877) ).
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enforce performance or punish non-performance of the obligation.'
An action in rem with respect to land or a tangible chattel ought
to be brought in a court which can seize the property, because that
court alone can give possession to the winner.'
When it was asked what court had power to proceed in rem
with respect to shares of stock, minds trained to think in terms of
physical location carried the process over into this new and foreign
field. There were at least four possibilities. First, it might be
said that the share was present with the record owner, upon the
maxim mobilia sequuntur personam; but that was only a maxim,
not a statement of fact, and the record owner constituted only one
end of the obligation, and so far as remedies were concerned, the
less important end. Again, the share could be said to be present
where the certificate could be found, since there was something
tangible which the court could seize; but the certificate was not a
negotiable instrument,' and in early law was only a muniment of
title, not always effective, and never necessary for the establish-
ment of rights as against the corporation.' Third, a location might
be assigned to the share in a place where the issuing corporation
owned property and transacted business; but the shareholder did
not own any part of that property. The last possibility was to lo-
cate the share at the permanent and official abiding place of the
corporation which issued it. Since the final proof of stock owner-
ship was upon books kept by the corporation, and since the ulti-
mate benefit of stock ownership had to be derived from the cor-
poration, the court having personal jurisdiction over it was the
only one which could effectively compel it to make good its obliga-
tions to the shareholder.
This practical superiority enjoyed by the court of the cor-
porate domicile in dealing with ownership of and claims upon
shares of stock gave to that court jurisdiction of such proceedings,
and this conclusion was embodied in the statement that the situs
of corporate shares was at the corporation's official place of ex-
5Pennoyer v. Neff, supra n. 4; Arndt v. Griggs, supra n. 4. This broad
statement, used only for purposes of illustration, overlooks the possibility of
personal jurisdiction based upon allegiance or domicil.
6 The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 29 L. ed. 152 (1885).
76 FLETCHER, CYcLoPEDiA CoRpoRATIoNs (1917) § 3779, and cases cited.
5Pacifile National Bank v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 227, 11 S. Ct. 984 (1891);
Jefferson County Savings Bank v. Compton, 192 Ala. 16, 68 So. 261 (1915).
In Lipscomb v. Condon, 56 W. Va. 416, 49 S. E. 392 (1904) the court said,
in the 5th and 6th headnotes: "A certificate of stock is not the stock itself,
but is evidence of its existence and ownership. Though, when issued, such
certificate is a muniment of title, it is not essential to the existence of the
property represented by it."
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istence. This was not a statement of fact, nor was it the reason
for the rule. It was simply a method of stating the conclusion at
which the law had arrived.
It was accordingly settled that under statutes authorizing
suits to quiet title to such personal property, or to enforce liens or
claims upon it in the absence of the owner or adverse claimant, the
suit might be brought in the court of the state which created the
issuing corporation.0 When attachments and executions were per-
mitted to be levied upon intangible property, the proper place for
the levy upon shares of stock was in the state which chartered the
corporation, although both the owner and the certificate were else-
where.u Likewise administration upon shares of stock was prop-
erly obtainable in the state of incorporation," although the course
of descent of the property was determined by the law of the domi-
cile of the decedent.'
Because these conclusions were expressed in terms of physical
location, which had been borrowed from a more appropriate sphere,
it was deemed inconceivable that a thing could be in two places at
the same time, and the consequence was to deny to all courts, except
those of the corporate domicile, any jurisdiction in rem with re-
spect to corporate shares."' Power to seize the certificate was imma-
terial.' Indeed even the court of a state in which the issuing cor-
0 See the remarks of Mr. Justice Holmes in dissenting in Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 96, 50 S. Ct. 59, 62 (1929).
10,Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1, 20 S. Ct. 559 (1900);
Hamil v. lowers, 133 Ga. 216, 65 S. E. 961 (1909); Michigan Trust Co. v.
Probasco, 29 Ind. App. 109, 63 N. E. 255 (1902); Amparo Mining Co. v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 555, 73 Ati. 249 (1909); Gamble v. Dawson,
67 'Wash. 72, 120 Pac. 1060 (1912).
u Ashley v. Quintard, 90 Fed. 84 (C. C., N. D. Ohio, 1898); Winslow v.
Fletclier, 53 Conn. 390, 4 Atl. 250 (1885); Cord v. Newlin, 71 N. J. L. 438,
59 Ati. 22 (1904); Plimpton v. Bigelow, 93 N. Y. 592 (1883); Christmas v.
Biddle, 13 Pa. St. 223 (1850).
"Murphy v. Crouse, 135 Cal. 14, 66 Pac. 971 (1901) ; Richardson v. Busch,
198 Mo. 175, 95 S. W. 894 (1906); In re Fitch's Estate, 160 N. Y. 87, 54 N. E.
701 (1899).
"Lowndes v. Cooch, 87 Md. 478, 39 Atl. 1045 (1898).
145 FLETCHER, Op. cit. supra n. 7, § 3141; 7 THomPsoN CoRPoRATxoNs (3d
ed. 1927) § 5818.
'5Pinney v. Nevills, 86 Fed. 97 (C. C. Mass. 1898); Warrior Coal & Coke
Co. v. National Bank of Augusta, 169 Ala. 646, 53 So. 997 (1910); Armour
Bros. Banking Co. v. Smith, 113 Mo. 12, 20 S. W. 690 (1892); Richardson
supra n. 12; Christmas v. Biddle, supra n. 11.
In Christmas v. Biddle, where it was sought to attach shares of stock of a
foreign corporation by levying upon certificates which had been deposited with
a broker for sale in the state of the forum, the court said, "This stock is
held and transferable according to the law of its creation, the statute of Mis-
sissippi, on the books of the bank only, either in person by the holder, or by
his attorney duly appointed. It will hardly be contended that lands in Mis-
3
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poration was doing business, had no jurisdiction in rem as to its
shares, although its power to coerce the corporation was ample."
These rules became established in a period when corporations
were few, when they did business for the most part as local enter-
prises, and when shares of stock formed a relatively small part of
the national wealth. With the tremendous growth of corporations,
both in numbers and in the territorial extent of their activities, two
traditional views about corporations came to be revised. In the
first place the old notion that a corporation could only exist in one
place, gave way to the view that a corporation could be present in
many places at the same time by virtue of its activities which are
described as "doing business." In the second place, after the
transfer of shares had become a common business transaction the
layman attached more significance to a stock certificate than the
law allowed. The certificate came to be a thing of value, repre-
senting for all practical purposes the share itself." It was inevit-
able that .the law should adapt itself to these developments.
So courts began to reverse themselves in order to hold that
proceedings in rem with respect to shares of stock could properly
be brought in a state in which the issuing corporation owned prop-
erty and did business, although its corporate domicile was for-
eign."3 Such decisions are generally put on the ground that trans-
sissippi could be attached, because the owner had sent on to this city his title
deed with power to a broker to sell the same and raise money. Yet there is,
in fact, no difference. It is the stock of the bank which is attached in this
case, and the individual to whom the certificate of stock was sent with power
to sell, is made the garnishee. Bank stock is made subject to levy and attach-
ment, recently by our statutes; but, then, it is bank stock of our own State,
subject to our own laws, and transferable by judicial sale under them; and not
British, or French bank stock, or the bank stock of any other State, which,
in this respect, is to be considered as a different sovereignty, and the property
created by its laws must be considered subject to those laws, because its banks
can exist in no other mode, nor in any other place than prescribed by its laws."
8Ashley v. Quintard, supra n. 11; N. J. Sheep & Wool Co. v. Traders Deposit
Bank, 104 Ky. 90, 46 S. W. 677 (1898); U. S. Express Co. v. Hurlock, 120
Md. 107, 87 Atl. 834 (1913); Plimpton v. Bigelow, supra n. 11; Ireland v.
Globe Milling & Reduction Co., 19 R. I. 180, 32 Atl. 921 (1895).
A case which seems to have had considerable influence in this country is
In re Clark, (1904) 1 Ch. 294. T, domiciled in England, owned shares of stock
of a company organized under the laws of South Africa. The company main-
tained transfer oices both in South Africa and in England. The certificates
were kept among T's effects in England. T left a will bequeathing
his personal property situated in England to his "Home Trustee,"
and all his personal property situated abroad to his "Foreign Trustee."
Looking to the facts that the certificates were kept in England, and that the
shares were transferable in England as well as in South Africa, the court held
that these shares passed to the "Home Trustee," although the technical situs
of the shares was in South Africa.
Vidal v. So. Am. Securities Co., 276 Fed. 855 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); London,
Paris & Am. Bank, Ltd. v. AronsteiA, 117 Fed. 601 (C. C. A. 9th, 1902),
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1932], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol38/iss3/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
fer books are kept in the place where the corporation is doing
business. Again, the conclusion is stated in terms of situs.
A more important development has taken place in recognition
of the commercial importance of a stock certificate. Perhaps the
leading case along this line is Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting
Company.? There a New York creditor sought to attach shares of
stock of a foreign corporation belonging to a non-resident defendant
by seizing the certificates, which had been endorsed in blank by the
owner and pledged with a resident of New York as collateral secur-
ity. The Court held that the attachment was valid. Answering
the argument that the certificate was not the share and could not
give it a location in New York, Gray, J., said:
"The distinctions sought to be drawn are largely artificial.
The truth is that it (the stockholder) did have property here,
in the common acceptation of the term, as well as in the eye of
the law. Certificates of stock are treated by business men as
property for all practical purposes. They are sold in the
market, and they are transferred as collateral security for
loans, and they are used in various ways as property. They
pass by delivery from hand to hand, and they are the subject
of larceny."
Upon the authority of this decision lower New York Courts
have held that shares of stock in a foreign corporation belonging
to a non-resident defendant, may be attached in New York when
the certificate for the stock has been endorsed in blank and placed
in the hands of an agent in New York for sale,' and even when it
has not been endorsed at all.' There are observations to a similar
cert. den., 187 U. S. 641, 23 S. Ct. 841; Wait v. Kern River, etc. Co., 157
Cal. 16, 106 Pac. 98 (1909); Parke-Cramer, Co. v. So. Express Co., 185 N. C.
428, 117 S. E. 505 (1923), cert. den. 263 U. S. 717, 44 S. Ct. 180.
" 165 N. Y. 193, 58 N. E. 896 (1900). Commenting on this case, it is said,
in 2 CooK, CORPOATIONS (6th ed. 1908) 1272: "It must be admitted that
this decision, although apparently a wide departure from the common law, is
a correct decision, in view of the fact that the certificates of stock have gradu-
ally grown to be more than mere receipts or evidence of stock, and have
come to be the stock itself, practically, in business transactions, especially in
America, and, like a promissory note, a certificate of stock is property in
itself and carries title, irrespective of. the corporate books and of transfer on
the corporate books. The decisions on this subject may perhaps be reconciled
on the ground that where the words of the statute are broad enough to allow
an attachment to be levied on certificates of stock, such a levy is effective,
inasmuch as certificates of stock now represent value in themselves, in very
much the same way as promissory notes."
0 People ex rel. Wynn v. Grifenhagen, 167 App. Div. 572, 152 N. Y. Supp.
679 (1915).
"General Motors Corp. v. Ver Linden, 199 App. Div. 375, 192 N. Y. Supp.
28 (1922).
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effect from other courts.' The question has not recently arisen
in many states because attachment and execution statutes have, for
the most part, been framed with reference to the earlier law and
contain no provision for levies upon shares of stock, except by
service of process upon the issuing corporation."
A similar development has taken place in cases arising under
Section 57 of the Federal Judicial Code,"' and in suits in state
courts to establish liens or claims upon shares of stock, or to quiet
title to such property. There are several decisions to the effect
that such proceedings may be maintained against absent defendants
in a court which has within its power stock certificates upon which
to act, although the property involved is the stock of a foreign
corporation.' Likewise in the field of administration there is
2 Mitchell v. Leland Co., 246 Fed. 103 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917) ; Baar v. Smith,
275 Pac. 861 (Cal. App. 1929).
2Bouree v. Trust Francais, etc., 14 Del. Ch. 332, 127 Atl. 56 (1924); An-
drews v. Guyaquil & Quito R. Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 211, 60 Atl. 568 (1905), aff'd.
71 N. J. Eq. 768, 71 Atl. 1133; Harris v. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co., 75 0kla.
105, 182 Pac. 85 (1919).
28 U. S. C. (1926) § 118.
25 Norris v. Loham, 16 F. (2d) 355 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); Franz v. Buder,
11 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Beale v. Carpenter, 235 Fed. 273 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1916).
In Direction der Disconto Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corp., 300 Fed. 741
(D. C., S. D. N. Y., 1924), a case which involved the effect to be given to a
seizure of endorsed certificates of stock of a foreign corporation, Learned
Hand, J., said: "The plaintiffs2 cases do not look to another conclusion.
The case of Jellenik v. Huron Copper Co., 177 U. S. 1, 20, Sup. Ct. 559, 44 L.
Ed. 647, is often cited to show that corporate shares can have no situs except at
the domicile of the corporation. It holds nothing of the sort; only that they
do have a situs there, which is a very different matter. In truth, corporate
shares have a situs in both places, so long as we insist upon applying to them
a word drawn from the law of land and chattels, which must be in a single
place at a time. Because a share, if we do not wish to call it a chose in action,
is at least a legal relation, and can have no spatial character except by virtue
of the parties to the relation. Wherever either party is, there is the property
as respects such parts of the relation as touch that party. Where the corpor-
ation is, there dividends must be paid and all other duties performed to which
the shareholder is entitled. There also may the soverign declare who shall be
the shareholder. Acts required of the corporation as performance of those
duties will be normally treated as performance elsewhere. Similarly, where
the shareholder is, there the share may be transferred by compulsion, and
perhaps, since he is subject to compulsion, by decree in rem, even when he
does not obey. There is no inconsistency in all this until one presupposes
that, because the share is one place, it cannot be in any other. Jellenik v.
Huron Copper Co., supra, does not intimate anything of the sort."
This passage seems to assert a jurisdiction to deal with shares of stock
either at the place of charter or at the place where the owner may be found.
In that case, however, the seizure was effected in the absence of both the
corporation and the owner. The explanation probably is that, by endorsing
the certificates and depositing them in England, the foreign owner subjected
them to English law, and in so doing subjected himself to that law to the
extent of his interest in the stock.
6
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modern authority to the effect that ancillary administration upon
the stock of a foreign corporation is unnecessary, if the certificate
for the stock may be found within the territory of the principal
administrator.'
This tendency to give to a stock certificate a legal significance
commensurate with its commercial importance is evidenced, and is
given further impetus, by the provisions of the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act. Sections 1 and 5 of the Act make the certificate
virtually a negotiable instrument. ' Section 13 provides that, "No
attachment or levy upon shares of stock for which a certificate is
outstanding shall be valid until such certificate be actually seized
by the officer making the attachment or levy, or be surrendered to
the corporation which issued it, or its transfer by the holder be
enjoined." This Act in so far as it has become applicable gives a
new practical importance to the power to reach a stock certificate.
Although a stock certificate has in many states been elevated
from a mere muniment of title to the rank of negotiable instru-
ments, and although a new situs of corporate stock has been found
at the place where the certificate is, it by no means follows that
the jurisdiction of the court of the corporate domicile, or of the
court of the state where the corporation owns property and does
business, has been done away with.' Jurisdiction in ren still
remains to those courts even in the view of the New York Court of
Appeals, which has gone further than any other court in giving
legal significance to the presence of the stock certificate.' The
" Norrie v. Lohman, supra n. 25; Griswold v. Kelly Springfield Tire Co.,
94 N. J. Eq. 308, 120 Atl. 324 (1916); Lockwood v. U. S. Steel Corp., 209
N. Y. 375, 103 N. E. 697 (1913).
2 Jenkins v. Continental Trust Co., 150 Md. 416, 133 Atl. 610 (1926); Jack-
con v. Portland Cement Co., 238 Mich. 476, 213 N. W. 863 (1927); Stoltz
v. Carroll, 99 Ohio St. 289, 124 N. E. 226 (1919).
United Cigarette Machine Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 12 F. (2d) 634
(C. C. A. 2d, 1926); Martel v. Block, 15 La. 863, 98 So. 398 (1923); Moys v.
Union Trust Co., 276 Pa. 58, 119 Atl. 738 (1923); LeRoy Sargent & Co. v.
McHarg, 42 S. D. 307, 174 N. W. 742 (1919).
20 erWe have not overlooked the case of Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting
Co., 165 N. Y. 193, 58 N. E. 896, 55 L. R. A. 796, where it was held by a
divided court that certificates of stock of a foreign corporation belonging to
a nonresident in the possession of a resident of this state as security for a
debt and the interest of the owner or pledger therein was a property right
within the state which might be levied upon under warrant of attachment.
While that decision perhaps is in conflict with some of the cases cited which
hold that certificates of stock are not property and subject to proceedings in
the state wherein they are located, I do not see that in any manner conflicts
with the proposition established by so many decisions that the interest of a
stockholder in a domestic corporation is property which may be regarded as
having its situs in this state." Holmes v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 359, 114 N. E. 841,
844 (1916).
7
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situation, therefore, is that for purposes of proceedings in rem,
corporate shares may be reached in three places. The old view has
prevailed in some jurisdictions to the extent of holding that the
presumptions are against giving to shares a situs at the place where
the certificate may be found and that express statutory warrant
for such procedure must be found; but even this concession is
apparently not made by the Supreme Court of Appeals of this
state.n
The question then arises, what will happen in case of a con-
flict between two or more of these possible jurisdictions? Suppose
two courts, one having the issuing corporation before it and the
other having the certificate before it, proceed to pass judgments
in rem with respect to the shares. The rule for the solution of
such conflicts as between state and federal courts, has been that
the one which first assumes the jurisdiction in point of time will
be allowed to retain it until the matter is finally disposed of.'
There is one case holding that this is the rule as to the type of
conflict which we are now considering,' but there is plausible
reason for believing that the court sitting at the domicile of the
corporation still enjoys the practical superiority of having the
last word.
In 1917, when the tendency to identify the share with the
certificate was not unknown, there arose the case of Baker -v Baker,
Eccles & Company," in which it appeared that a Tennessee court,
having before it a certificate of stock of a foreign corporation, which
had been left in Tennessee by the owner when he died there, under-
took to make an adjudication in rem as to the ownership of the
shares. The winner in this proceeding took her decree and the
certificates to Kentucky, where the corporation was domiciled, and
brought a suit there to compel the corporation to recognize her as
the stockholder. The Kentucky court proceeded to ignore the Ten-
nessee decree, and to judge anew the property rights in the shares.
The case went to the Supreme Court on the question whether full
faith and credit was required to be given to the Tennessee decree,
and the Court answered in the negative, saying:
"We have no concern with the effect of the Tennessee
judgments upon the distribution of so much of decedent's
0 Moys v. Union Trust Co., 276 Pa. 58, 119 Atl. 738 (1923).
Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Hutchinson Lumber Co., 161 S. E. 559 (W.
Va. 1932).
2 Heidritter v. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S. 294, 28 L. ed. 729 (1884).
Norrie v. Lohman, supra n. 25.
242 U. S. 394, 37 S. Ct. 152 (1917).
8
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personalty as was situate within that State. The present
action affects only the ownership of shares of stock in a
Kentucky corporation, having no situs outside of its own State
so far as appears..... .No State need allow property of
a decedent to be taken without its border until debts due to its
own citizens have been satisfied; and there is nothing in the
Constitution of the United States aside from the full faith and
credit clause to prevent a State from giving a like protection
to its own citizens or residents who are interested in the sur-
plus after payments of debts. All of which goes to show, what
plaintiff in error in effect acknowledged when she brought her
present action in a Kentucky Court, that the Tennessee judg-
ments had no effect in rem upon the Kentucky assets now in
controversy.' 4a
In Miler v. Kaliwerke Aschersleben, A. G., the Alien Prop-
erty Custodian brought a suit to compel a New York corporation
to issue to him -certificates for shares of its stock which had been
seized by the Custodian as property of an alien enemy. The seizure
had been made by serving notice on the corporation.' The British
Public Trustee (the counterpart of our Alien Property Custodian)
intervened and alleged that he had seized these same shares by
taking possession of the certificates, which had been endorsed by
the alien owner and deposited in England, and, since his seizure
antedated that of the Custodian, he demanded that he be recognized
as owner of the shares. The court, professing not to pass on owner-
ship but merely "possession" of the shares, held that the Custodian
should prevail because his seizure was valid under the local law,
81a The case of Black Eagle Mining Company v. Conroy, 94 Okla. 199,
221 Pac. 425 (1923) goes even further. That suit involved title to certain shares
of stock in the Alining Company, an Oklahoma corporation. A stockholder
of the corporation died domiciled in Kansas, and possessed of the stock cer-
tificates in that state. Administration was had in Kansas, and the stock was
distributed to the next of kin, who were the plaintiffs in this suit. Thereafter
certain creditors of the deceased procured administration in Oklahoma, the
domicile of the corporation, and under an Oklahoma decree the deceased's
shares of stock were sold to pay his debts. The next of kin from Kansas
br~ught this suit to compel the corporation to recognize them as the owners
of the stock. The court held that the primary jurisdiction to deal with owner-
ship of the stock was in the State of Oklahoma, and that the plaintiffs took
nothing by the decree of the Kansas court. It will be noted that here there
was no dispute as to where the deceased was domiciled, as there was in the
Baker case. The State of Oklahoma merely protected local creditors, because
it had the last word in determining the ownership of and claim upon the
shares of stock.
U283 Fed. 746 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
5 This was a mode of seizure commonly used on the theory that the shares
had a situs at the place of incorporation. Garvan v. Certain Shares, etc., 276
Fed. 206 (D. C., S. D. N. Y., 1921); Columbia Brewing Co. v. Miller, 281
Fed. 289 (C. C. A..5th, 1922).
9
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and that "it is quite immaterial, so far as the mere fact of seizure
is concerned, whether the certificates were or were not in the pos-
session of the British Public Trustee."
Consider next the case of Direction Der Disconto-Geseflschaft
v. U. S. Steel Corporation,' where a German corporation sought
to be declared the owner of certain shares of stock of the defendant
corporation. The British Public Trustee intervened and set up
the fact that the certificates for these shares of stock, while owned
by the German company, had been endorsed in blank and left in
England, and that the Trustee had seized the certificates under the
provisions of English law. The Trustee demanded to be recognized
as the owner of the shares. The Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice
Holmes, held that the title to the certificates depended on the law
of the place where they were seized, and that the United States,
desiring "to consider itself civilized," would recognize the validity
of the transfer as against the corporation. Then followed this
interesting passage:
"If the United States had taken steps to assert its para-
mount power, as in Miller v. Kaliwerke Aschersleben, A. G.,
283 Fed. 746, a different question would arise that we have no
occasion to deal with. The United States has taken no such
steps. It therefore stands in its usual attitude of indifference
when title to the certificate is lawfully obtained. There is no
conflict in matter of fact or matter of law between the United
States and England and therefore Baker v. Baker, Eccles &
Co., 242 U. S. 394, does not apply."
It seems from this language, and from the cases which it
distinguishes, that seizure of certificates and seizure of shares are
vitally different things. Of course, nobody would litigate about a
piece of paper as such, and the purpose of both seizures is to reach
the beneficial interest in the shares of stock. But the fact remains
that one who has got the certificate by decree or by judicial sale
must then repair to a place where the corporation is, to find out
what he has got. If the state whose laws govern the relations
between the corporation and its members "stands in its usual posi-
tion of indifference," or if it has by legislation merged the share
in the certificate, then the holder of the certificate may also become
the owner of the share; otherwise the paramount power of the state
of incorporation may cut him off.'
- 267 U. S. 22, 45 S. Ct. 207 (1925).
23 CoNMIcT op LAwS RESTATEMNT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 57 states the
relation between the two jurisdictions as follows:
" (1) Shares in a corporation are subject to the jurisdiction of the
10
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We may, therefore, conclude that ultimate jurisdiction in rem
with respect to shares of corporate stock rests in the state of incor-
poration; that this power may also be exercised in a place where
the issuing corporation owns property and does business, provided
transfer records are kept there; and that it may be exercised in a
state where the certificate may be found, subject to the law of the
state of incorporation. If these conclusions must be stated in
language of location, it perhaps ought to be said that the certi-
ficates have a situs of their own and that the shares have a situs
of their own, unless the law of the charter has merged the share
in the certificate.
Taxation
Although we talk about taxes upon property, and taxes upon
transfers of property, the fact is that all taxation is upon individu-
als. An individual may be taxed because he owns property or
because he has made or received a transfer of property, but the
tax falls none the less upon the individual.' The traditional justi-
fication of taxation is that persons who are subject to the pro-
tection of civilized government, must pay the expense of maintain-
ing such a government.' "The public revenues are a portion that
state in which the corporation was incorporated.
"(2) The share certificate is subject to the jurisdiction of the state
within whose territory it is.
"(3) To the extent to which the state in which the corporation was
incorporated embodies the share in the certificate, the share is exclusively
subject to the jurisdiction of the state which has jurisdiction over the
certificate. " I
This mode of stating the law raises the question whether a state which has
adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act has merged the share in the certifi-
cate. In Harvey v. Harvey, 290 Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923) it was held
that, notwithstanding the provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, shares
of stock retain their sits in the state of charter for purposes of a suit to
try title to the shares. The seemingly contrary decision in Klein v. Wilson
& Co., 7 F. (2d) 769, 772, 777, (C. C. A. 3d, 1925) may be explained on the
ground that the complaint sought a general receivership of a foreign corpor-
ation whose only property in the forum consisted of shares of stock of another
corporation chartered there, and that general receivership was more prac-
tical in the place where the defendant was organized and did business. The
Uniform Act does not give any special efficacy to the certificate until it is
endorsed or assigned by the record owner; if this has not been done, there
seems to be no merger under the Act, and an adjudication upon the certificate
would be perilous.
8 " 'Taxes generally are imposed upon persons . . . . not upon property,
although generally measured more or less by reference to the riches of the
person taxed, on grounds not of fiction but of fact." Mr. Justice Holmes,
dissenting, in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 97, 50 S.
Ct. 59, 62 (1929).
01 CooLEu, TAxATioN (3d ed. 1903) 1.
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each subject gives of his property, in order to secure or enjoy the
remainder."' Upon this theory it is proper that an individual's
taxes should be proportioned to the amount of benefit which he re-
ceives, which in many cases will depend upon the amount of prop-
erty which he owns, but of course no state is entitled to collect
something for nothing.
The state of which the person is a subject renders to him more
personal benefits than any other state. It provides for him safety
in which to enjoy whatever property or income he may have. A
personal tax upon him is, therefore, clearly justified, but when
the tax is levied with respect to particular property, and so is in a
manner of speaking, a tax upon that property, it was early recog-
nized that the state of which he was a subject ought not to lay the
tax unless it had rendered some service in connection with that
very property. When it was found that the relation between the
state and the property or transfer was sufficient to justify a tax,
it was said that the property had a situs in the state for purposes of
taxation. '
Because of the rather involved relationships which constitute
corporate stock, there frequently are several different states which
contribute something to the creation or enjoyment or transfer of
the property. Until recently it followed that there were often
several states which were entitled to demand a quid pro quo by
way of property or transfer taxes. The state in which the stock-
holder was domiciled could tax because the conflict of laws referred
to that state some questions concerning ownership and descent of the
property." The state which chartered the corporation could tax
because it created the body of rights and offered the means of
enforcing them." The state where the stock certificates were kept
could lay a tax because it protected the possession of these import-
ant indicia of ownership.' It was also argued that the state in
which the issuing corporation owned property and did business
41MONTESQUIEU, De L'Esprit Des Lois, Liv. XIII, c. 1.
"1 CooLLY, op. cit. supra n. 40, 84 et seq.
"3Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 S. Ct. 473 (1916); Hawley v.
Malden, 232 U. S. 1, 34 S. Ct. 201 (1914); People v. Union Trust Co., 255
Ill. 168, 99 N. E. 377 (1912); Welch v. Treasurer, 223 Mass. 87, 111 N. E.
774 (1916).
""So, too, it is well established that the state in which a corporation is
organized may provide, in creating it, for the taxation in that state of all
its shares, whether owned by residents or nonresidents." Rhode Island Hospital
Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69, 81, 46 S. Ct. 256, 258 (1926).
,0 Stern v. The Queen (1896) 1 Q. B. 211. It may be that in this country
this jurisdiction was limited to states where the certificates had a "business
situs." New Orleans v. Stemple, 175 U. S. 309, 20 S. Ct. 110 (1899).
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could tax because it protected the corporation in the possession and
exploitation of the substance which made the stock worth having."
Such multiple taxation of the same property was admittedly
undesirable, but it was quite generally believed that jurisdiction
to tax (either on general principles of the conflict of laws or under
a due process clause) was to be determined by reference to tradi-
tion and logic rather than as a matter of expediency. So double
taxation was not in itself a denial of due process of law.'
The complete reversal of doctrine in this respect which has
recently been brought about by our Supreme Court is one of the
most striking developments in our law. The course of the revolution,
beginning with Frick v. Pennsylvania,"' and culminating, for the
present at least, in First National Bank of Boston v. Maine," is so
familiar that it would be unprofitable to trace it. It is enough to
note the three cases bearing most directly on the taxation of shares
of stock.
In Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company v. Doughton,' the
Court considered a North Carolina statute which sought to impose
a tax with respect to the devolution from one non-resident to
another of shares of stock of a foreign corporation in cases where
the corporation was doing business in North Carolina and where
fifty per cent or more of its property was located there, the tax
being computed on the proportion of the value of the shares which
the property owned by the company in North Carolina bore to all
its property. The statute was held unconstitutional on the ground
that the shareholder had no legal interest in the property of the
corporation, so that there was nothing of his in North Carolina to be
taxed."
"Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 809, 815.
'7 CcNo doubt it would be a great advantage to the country and to the
individual states if principles of taxation could be agreed upon which did not
conflict with each other, and a common scheme could be adopted by which
taxation of substantially the same property in two jurisdictions could be
avoided. But the Constitution of the United States does not go so far."
Holmes, X., in Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730, 23 S. Ct. 402 (1903).
s 268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603 (1925).
"c 52 Ct. 174 (1932).
L0 upra n. 3.
m If we are to look through all fiction and ignore impractical distinctions,
then the tax sought to be imposed by North Carolina seems to be more nearly
justifiable than a similar tax at the domicile of the decedent. The property
of the corporation situated in North Carolina gave to the decedent's shares
just the proportion of their value which was used as the basis of the tax;
and North Carolina, which protected the corporation in its business, con-
tributed more to the value of the shares than did the state of the decedent's
domicile, which merely enabled him to live and die in peace. Of course this
sort of argument might lead to the proposition that no state could tax shares
13
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In 1930 the movement against double taxation was advanced
in the decision of Baldwin v. Missouri.' There it was held that
the presence in a state of negotiable bonds and notes did not give
that state power to lay a tax with respect to the transfer of that
property by will from one non-resident to another. The decision
did not relate to certificates of stock, but there was no valid dis-
tinction. Any doubt was resolved with the decision of First Nation-
al Bank of Boston v. Maine,' in January last. In that case
the Court declared unconstitutional a Maine statute imposing so-
called death duties with respect to shares of stock owned by a non-
resident in a corporation chartered in Maine and owning most of
its property there. Whatever else will be said of the decision it
leaves the law clear: with trifling exceptions," the sole power to
tax corporate stock is in the state of the domicile of its owner.
The dissenting opinions in the Maine and Missouri cases, and
in the other recent cases of similar trend,' have stated so authorita-
tively the arguments in opposition to the conclusions of the Court
that it would be a work of presumption to undertake to add to
them." I may be permissible to regret that the majority of the
of stock if the corporation's assets were taxed at their location. This would
not be a long step beyond Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, supra n. 9.
281 U. S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436 (1930).
"Supra n. 49.
4There seem to remain two possibilities of taxation in states other than
the domicile of the owner or decedent: (1) In Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 213 (1930), McReynolds, J., seemed to recognize
an extant jurisdiction to tax choses in action in a place where they have a
"business situs," leaving open the question whether such taxation would
exclude the right to tax at the domicile of the owner. (2) In First Nat.
Bank of Boston v. Maine, supra n. 49, at 178, Sutherland, J., while denying
the power of the state of incorporation to tax upon the devolution of shores
of stock, said: "Undoubetdly the state of incorporation may tax the transfer
of the stock of a nonresident decedent and the issue of a now certificate to
take the place of the old, under the power generally to impose taxes of that
character. But plainly such a tax is not a death duty which flows from the
power to control the succession; it is a stock transfer tax which flows from
the power of the state to control and condition the operations of the corpo.
ration which it creates." This seems to make due process depend upon tht
size of the tax; for how else than by looking to the size can it be determined
whether the state of incorporation is making pretensions to having a hand in
the succession or is merely exacting a fee for the minor function of trans-
ferring one end of the obligation?
5First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, supra n. 49, Stone, Holmes and
Brandeis, JJ., dissenting; Baldwin v. Missouri, supra n. 52, Holmes, Brandeis
and Stone dissenting; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. 8.
204, 50 S. Ct. 98 (1930), Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting; Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. v. Virginia, supra n. 9, Holmes, J., dissenting.
rThe burden of the dissent from the tendency of the Court is summed up
in these words from Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 596, 50 S. Ct. 436,
439 (1930). "And what are the grounds? Simply so far as I can see that
it is disagreeable to a bondowner to be taxed in two places. Very probably
14
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Court, after having put most of these revolutionary decisions on
the plain ground that double taxation is a bad thing," should have
fallen back on an argument about situs in the Maine case. There
the Court said:
"The rule of immunity from taxation by more than one
state ....... is broader than the applications thus far
made of it. In its application to death taxes, the rule rests
for its justification upon the fundamental conception that the
transmission from the dead to the living of a particular thing,
whether corporeal or incorporeal, is an event which cannot take
place in two or more states at one and the same time ....
Due regard for the processes of correct thinking compels the
conclusion that a determination fixing the local situs of a thing
for the purpose of transferring it in one state carries with it
an implicit denial that there is a local situs in another state
for the purpose of transferring the same thing there.
Of course an intangible thing, consisting of a congeries of
rights and duties, cannot have a local situs in two places at the
same time; neither can it have a local situs in any one place. The
transfer to the First National Bank of Boston undoubtedly occur-
red in Massachusetts; but unless it also occured in Maine the Bank
got nothing but a piece of paper.
CONCLUSION
If, as an ancient philosopher is reported to have said, the world
cannot be made perfect until we call things by their right names,
we had perhaps as well begin on the word "situs." If we were
to ask a man of no legal training to state in the abstract where a
thing is, he would probably reply that a thing is in the place where
it might be good policy to restrict taxation to a single place, and perhaps the
technical conception of domicil may be the best determinant. But it seems
to me that if that result is to be reached it should be reached through under-
standing among the States, by uniform legislation or otherwise, not by evok-
ing a constitutional prohibition from the void of 'due process of law,' when
logic, tradition and authority have united to declare the right of the State to
lay the now prohibited tax."'
"So, in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra n. 55 the Court
said: "Primitive conditions have passed; business is now transacted on a
national scale. A very large part of the country's wealth is invested in
negotiable securities whose protection against discrimination, unjust and op.
pressive taxation, is a matter of the greatest moment."
And in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, supra n. 9, the Court said:
"The adoption of a contrary rule would 'involve possibilities of an extremely
serious character' by permitting double taxation, both unjust and oppressive.II
In these cases the Court seemed to treat "situs" as merely a word to use
in describing the conclusion reached, and not as a representation of the reason
for the conclusion,
15
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you have to go to get it. So it is in law. In seeking to reach
corporate stock with legislative or judicial process we must look to
the various legal materials to determine how and where it can be
reached for our particular purpose. Nobody would criticize us
for calling that place a situs, but we put the cart before the horse
when we think that the use of the word helped us to find the
place.'
I This subject has been treated in a slightly different connection in an
article by Powell, The Businss Situs of Credits (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 89.
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